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The author delivered a public lecture at the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies on 22 October 2001 drawing upon his 
forthcoming book, Pursuing Pinochet, on the effort to bring 
Pinochet to justice in Chile, Argentina, Spain, France, 
Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy, Britain and the 
United States, and its implications. The following is an 
abbreviated version of that lecture, which was jointly 
sponsored by the IALS and the Institute of Latin American 
Studies (also of the School of Advanced Studies, University of 
London) and attracted a capacity audience
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'SUPERJUDGE'
Balthasar Garzon is undoubtedly a phenomenon. In Spain 
he is popularly known as superjuez (Super judge). He has 
pursued, amongst others, international drug traffickers, 
Arab gun-runners, money launderers, terrorists (ETA), 
state terrorists (GAL) under the former Socialist 
Government, and mass media monopolies (SOGECABLE 
and Silvio Berlusconi's involvement in the Spanish media). 
This has polarised Spanish public opinion, with a majority 
supporting his audacity and courage and a minority 
regarding him as a publicity-obsessed hijacker of the law. 
Beyond Spain, especially since he sought the extradition of 
former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet from Britain, 
he is seen almost exclusively as a superhero in the defence 
of human rights. Love him or loathe him, he has rapidly 
become Spain's, and probably the worlds, best-known 
living judge.
O I O
Is Garzon simply an anti-establishment champion of 
human rights? Not necessarily. While he exposed the 
unlawful state violence against ETA, his attacks on ETAO '
and its support structure   closing a newspaper that acted 
as its mouthpiece, rounding up the entire leadership of its 
political wing, cutting off its sources of cash   have served 
Spain's current centre-right government well, while 
problematising, at least in Spain, his reputation as a
defender of human rights. On the other hand, the case 
that made him an international name   the Pinochet case 
  also gave Spain's centre-right government a huge 
diplomatic headache. In short, Judge Garzon transcends 
easy labelling.
THE 'PECULIARITIES OF THE SPANISH'
In most countries, the state could (and probably would) 
have strangled the Spanish cases that gave rise to the 
Pinochet litigation at birth since the discretion as to when 
to prosecute crimes is normally vested in the public 
prosecutor or the state, not the courts. However, the 
effort to bring Pinochet to justice was facilitated and 
legitimated by the quirks of the Spanish legal system. The 
cases in Spain used a procedure known as action popular 
that permits any Spanish citizen, not necessarily the 
injured party, to file charges in the public interest without 
cost and without (during the investigative stage) theV O O O 7
support of the public prosecutor. Thus, Spain's rules 
governing legal standing are exceptionally expansive.
The position of the plaintiffs in the Chile case was also 
sustained by a 1958 Spanish-Chilean convention on dual 
citizenship, which permits Chileans, irrespective of 
whether they are resident in Spain, to file charges in a 
Spanish court with the same rights as any Spanish citizen.
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The prosecution of Pinochet was further assuaged by 
the distinctive character of Spain's national superior court, 
the Audenda National, which has universal jurisdiction to 
investigate and prosecute certain serious crimes 
committed outside Spain, including genocide and 
terrorism. By endorsing a broad interpretation of universal 
jurisdiction and genocide, the Audencia National provided 
crucial backing for Garzon's efforts to arrest Pinochet in 
London and extradite him to Spain.
CREATING GLOBAL JUSTICE: ON THE 
COLLISION AND CONVERGENCE OF LEGAL 
CULTURES
The activities of Continental European (Civil Law) 
investigating magistrates like Garzon seem remarkable 
when approached from the standpoint of the situation in 
Britain. It is not only that senior professional judges in 
Britain are almost always in late middle age. Britain and 
the rest of the common law world regard judges in cases of 
crimes as referees in a contest between the prosecution 
and the accused. Within the Civil Law tradition, however, 
the state has a major role in the criminal process, and the 
judiciary is part of an investigative process concerned to 
ascertain the truth.
Of course, few continental magistrates court the media 
(and controversy) with such apparent relish and 
persistence as Garzon. Yet Garzon is not unique. He is 
simply the current leading light of an important (but much 
neglected) transnational movement: namely, the increasing 
number of activist investigating magistrates prepared to 
confront organised crime and political corruption. In the 
1980s and '90s, Italian investigating magistrates   the likes 
of Giovanni Falcone, Paolo Borsellino (both of whom 
became national folk-heroes following their assassination 
by the Mafia) and Antonio Di Pietro, whose efforts to 
'cleanse' Milan's 'bribe city' culture resulted in the 
imprisonment of numerous politicians and businesspeople 
  have served as role models for a younger generation of 
magistrates in the Civil Law world who have increasingly 
asserted their independence from the executive and 
legislative arms of the state.
o
In France, too, investigating magistrates have recently 
become more active and assertive in die probing of 
government and allied public scandals. The Argentine and 
Chile cases in Spain were inspired, in part, by the efforts 
of the Italian prosecutors dating from 1982 to bring 
Argentine military leaders to justice in Italy. With his 
aggressive tactics, Garzon stepped forward as a kind of 
Spanish counterpart to the Italian judges. Like those 
investigative judges, Garzon has put his life at risk by 
venturing beyond the prosecution of common crimes to 
the murky world where criminals and national security 
operations intersect.
Otiier aspects of the Pinochet case in Spain highlight the
apparent cultural chasm between the common law and 
civil law. Take the activism of associations of prosecutors 
and judges in support of the anti-Pinochet forces. The 
Union Progresista de Fiscales (UPF), who initiated the 
Argentine case in Spain, is one of several private 
associations in the Civil Law World that have no direct 
counterpart in the Common Law sphere. During the 
Franco period, the UPF sought greater autonomy for the 
Spanish legal profession from the state, acting as a 
clandestine critic of Franco's record on human rights. 
With the return to democracy in Spain, it and allied 
associations became an important force in the 
administration of justice. Likewise, associations of 
European magistrates had no compunction in supporting 
the effort to prosecute Pinochet.
But it is Garzon's alleged injudicious conduct that has 
attracted most attention. His intense relationship with the 
media; his preparedness to attend and participate in public 
meetings and seminars involving or organised by those 
concerned to prosecute Pinochet; his high-profile 
appearances in London during the Pinochet case; his 
newspaper articles on politically sensitive issues; and the 
claims that lawyers acting on behalf of the plaintiffs 
assisted Garzon in his chamber with the preparation and 
dispatch of the request for Pinochet's arrest and 
extradition have raised questions as to the legitimate 
province of the investigating judge.
No doubt, some of the criticism of Garzon in Britain 
during the Pinochet case stemmed from a 
misunderstanding of the role of the investigating
o o o
magistrate in civilian legal systems. Moreover, special 
prosecutors exist in some common law jurisdictions with 
investigatory powers and resources more extensive than 
that of Civilian investigating magistrates. However, during 
the formal extradition hearing in London in September 
1999, Pinochet's lawyers argued (amongst other things) 
that Garzon's conduct was insufficiently independent, and 
that his extradition request was politically motivated. The 
judge at the hearing, Magistrate Ronald Bartle, decided 
that Pinochet could be extradited to Spain and tiiat it was 
unnecessary to consider Garzon's conduct.
Despite these apparent clashes of legal culture, the legal 
and political considerations at issue were strikingly similar 
in all the countries involved in the Pinochet saga. In
o
Britain, as in Spain, the Pinochet case raised questions of 
judicial independence and judicial propriety.
In both Britain and Spain, the courts were forced to re- 
examine the interface between domestic and international 
law and recognise that the traditional conception of 
international law   which gave primacy to the interests of 
the state - now connects with a wider range of actors and
o
subjects including the interests of the victims of torture, 
genocide and kidnapping. In both countries the courts 
creatively responded to the need to render international
11
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human rights law more effective by constructing a juridical 
edifice that expanded the jurisdiction of domestic courts 
but in an evolutionary and relatively circumspect fashion. 
In Spain and Britain, the courts ultimately derived 
universal criminal jurisdiction from domestic law, and not 
from customary international law. In part, this was 
because of judicial prudence: grounding jurisdiction in 
domestic law is likely to secure greater certainty and 
international legitimacy than deriving jurisdiction from 
customary international law.
In almost all the countries involved in the Pinochet 
litigation, the courts had to grapple with the question of 
whether domestic law establishing extraterritorial
o
jurisdiction could be utilised against alleged crimes 
committed prior to the creation of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and, therefore, in violation of the prohibition 
on ex postjacto laws.
Similarly, the issue of the relationship between law and 
politics   and the respective powers of the judicial, 
legislative and executive branches of the state   loomed
o
large in all the countries involved in the effort to bring 
Pinochet to justice. Clearly, the existence of a democratic 
government, an independent judiciary, the support 
systems for rights litigation and a lively public sphere are 
likely to have a material impact on whether the 
prosecution or extradition of human rights violators 
proceeds. In particular, the political will of the extraditing 
(or prosecuting) state is crucial, especially where the law 
does not permit victims to initiate proceedings without 
the support of the state or public prosecutor. Take the 
treatment of the Pinochet case in Britain.
When Pinochet visited Britain in 1994 and 1997, 
various individuals were unable to persuade the authorities 
to arrest Pinochet. The then Conservative Government's 
close links with, and support for Pinochet, reinforced the 
traditional reluctance of governments to allow their courts 
to be used to challenge the actions of other governments 
or their rulers. In these circumstances, Pinochet's 
prosecution in a Conservative Britain was extremely 
unlikely. In the autumn of 1998, a new Labour 
Government was in power. Apparently, the Home 
Secretary (Jack Straw) was not informed by the police or 
his officials of Pinochet's arrest until after it had been 
effected as UK law provides, namely, by the police 
persuading a magistrate to issue a warrant for Pinochet's 
arrest, as requested by Garzon. UK extradition law 
provided for a complex division of responsibilities as 
between the executive and the judicial branches of 
government affording the Home Secretary a broad, 'quasi- 
judicial' role. The ultimate decision to authorise 
extradition was vested in the Home Secretary, rather than 
the courts. Thus, Straw was under considerable political 
pressure, both domestic and international.
Most of the Labour Party and backbench MPs 
supported the Spanish action, while the bulk of the
Conservative Party, backbench MPs and senior grandees   
notably, Margaret Thatcher and Norman Lament   
pressed for Pinochet's release. Opinion in the country was 
also divided with apparently a majority supportive of 
Pinochet's detention and extradition. A small but vocal 
community of southern cone exiles undertook high- 
profile, peaceful demonstrations in support of Pinochet's 
detention, sustained by and sustaining linkages with the
' J o o
southern cone, Spain, the media, NGOs (such as Amnesty 
International, Human Plights Watch and the Medical 
Foundation for the Victims of Torture), politicians 
(notably, Jeremy Corbyn MP), and lawyer-activists (such as 
Geoffrey Bindman and Andy McEntee).
While Straw could have pulled the plug on the case at 
several stages in the proceedings, including the first week of 
Pinochet's arrest, he repeatedly stressed that he would 
determine Pinochet's fate when the judicial proceedings 
had been completed. He twice made the diplomatically 
difficult decision to permit Spain's extradition request to 
proceed. From the summer of 1999 onwards, however, 
Straw's handling of the case seemed to change, especially 
from September 1999 onwards. That Straw was 
considering representations made on behalf of Pinochet 
that it was unjust to dispatch Pinochet to Spain in view of 
Pinochet's poor state of health, and that Straw accepted 
such representations, was perfectly proper given his 
statutory powers concerning extradition. However, the 
manner and timing of the exercise of Straw's discretion in
o
the final stages of the case, including Pinochet's release,
o o '
gave the appearance that justice was not being done. For 
example, there was criticism that Pinochet's medical 
examination was flawed, that the report of the medical 
experts did not warrant Straw's conclusion that Pinochet 
was unfit to stand trial anywhere in the world, that Straw's 
haste was a result of a deal involving Chile, Spain and 
Britain, and a desire to influence the contemporaneous and 
closely-fought presidential elections in Chile. Whatever 
the merits of these claims, it is clear that Straw prevented 
the judicial proceedings taking their course. (The courts 
were scheduled to hear Pinochet's counsel's application for 
habeas corpus on 20 March 2000, but the Home Secretary 
finally determined to free Pinochet on 2 March 2000).
In Spain and Britain, the political and legal context in 
March 2000 was rather different from that pertaining 
when Pinochet was first arrested and detained in London 
some 17 months earlier, and this made it easier for the 
Aznar Government and Straw to act as they did in the final 
stages of the case. The courts of Spain and Britain had 
established important precedents that Pinochet's freedom 
could not eclipse.
ON CATALYSTS, CONTESTATION AND 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Although Pinochet was the first former head of state to
o
be held legally accountable for crimes of state, the
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Pinochet case built upon the legal foundations established 
by a series of domestic courts over the years imposing 
criminal responsibility on Nazi perpetrators of atrocities. 
The Pinochet precedent signals a larger potential role for 
domestic courts and the extension of the obligations of
o
governments to adhere to minimum standards of human 
rights. After a long period of structured oppression, the 
previously unimaginable became possible. Since the 
initiation of the Spanish cases in 1996, and especially 
since Pinochet's arrest in 1998, the victims have been 
given an unprecedented opportunity to tell their stories to 
the world and the investigation and prosecution of human 
rights violators (within and beyond the southern cone) has 
accelerated and deepened.
Countries around the world paid attention to what 
happened in the Pinochet case, and several decided that 
they were no longer prepared to be safe havens for former 
dictators and torturers, if only to avoid the glare of 
international attention focussing upon their own human 
rights records. The investigation, prosecution and 
extradition of human rights abusers worldwide have 
significantly increased. Recent examples include the 
indictment in Argentina of ex-President Stroessner of 
Paraguay; the effort to indict 'an African Pinochet', the 
exiled dictator of Chad, Hissene Habre, on torture 
charges before the Senegalese courts; the successful
o o '
prosecution in Belgium of Rwandan's for genocide; the 
prosecution in the Netherlands of former Suriname 
dictator Desi Bouterse on charges of torture; and theo 7
efforts of French and Chilean judges to interrogate Henry 
Kissinger about Operation Condor and the 1973 murder 
of American journalist Charles Horman in Chile. The 
world is moving towards increasing international co-
o o
operation to prosecute crimes against humanity, no matter 
where they are committed.
The "Garzon effect" and the Pinochet precedent both 
reflect and sustain what Slaughter and Heifer have called a 
"global community of law" that is constituted by 
overlapping networks of legal actors. They have also 
reinforced the impetus to create a permanent 
international criminal court and to indict Slobadan 
Milosevic, former President of Yugoslavia, for massive 
violations of human rights arising from his role in both the 
Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts.
The Pinochet case reactivated the US Justice 
Department's investigation of Pinochet's role in the 1976 
assassination of Letelier and Moffitt. Indeed, in 
September 2001 a civil lawsuit was initiated in New York 
against Kissinger for his alleged role in a 1970-kidnapping 
plot that resulted in the death of General Rene Schneider, 
who was then Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army.
The ad hoc tribunals in former Yugoslavia (1993) and 
Rwanda (1994) created by the UN Security Council, and 
the draft Statute of the International Criminal Court (July 
1998), all reject the defences of sovereign immunity and
specifically make provision for individual criminal 
responsibility. The Pinochet precedent and the Garzon 
effect are therefore part of a larger movement in 
international law diminishing impunity which, in turn, 
reflects and sustains the rapid shift towards new 
international human rights norms since the 1980's.
o
The Pinochet litigation also served as an important 
catalyst with respect to the release by the Clinton 
Administration of some of the CIA's previously classified 
files on human rights abuses in Chile which, in turn, 
disclosed the substantial role of the US in undermining 
Chile's democracy. The declassified information has 
proved of great assistance to those investigating and 
prosecuting the crimes of the military regimes.
While the causes of this metamorphosis are many and 
varied, the investigations in Spain and the decisions of the 
courts in Spain and Britain furnished a role model to 
judges, victims, activists, lawyers and even governments, 
legitimating local investigations and prosecutions. The fact 
that Garzon's investigations and the Pinochet precedent 
were regarded as legitimate, and that Garzon himself was 
the subject of international acclaim, vindicated them in 
the eyes of local actors. In Argentina and Chile, they 
provided a means by which the judiciary, hitherto 
admonished for its deference in the face of military 
dictatorships, could re-make its identity, transcend its 
relative insularity and fabricate a jurisprudence that is at 
the cutting-edge of international human rights law. That 
the world seemed to be watching them made this judicial 
and political revolution all the more urgent.
The judgements of the Spanish and British courts, 
together with allied international law materials (notably, 
the decisions of the Inter-American Commission) have 
yielded a jurisprudential lingua franca, seized upon and 
creatively developed by local actors yet nonetheless 
drawing upon local ideas, institutions and networks, some 
of which were long-standing. Thus, the transnational
o o '
transmission and reception of legal norms and strategies, 
and the hybridisation that it fostered, was characterised by 
a 'bottom up' - as well as the 'top down' - process. For 
example, the Vicaria (1976-1992) in Santiago provided an 
important role model for human rights organisations 
within and beyond the southern cone, as well as an 
important focus for transnational networks including the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the
o '
United Nations Human Rights Commission, theo '
International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty 
International and the Ford Foundation.
Similarly, the public space wrested by protest 
movements, such as the Madres de Plaza de Mayo in 
Argentina (and its Chilean counterparts), by investigatory 
journalists like Patricia Verdugo, and by individual lawyers 
acting pro bono, also proved important and enduring. In 
1979, Her nan Montealegre, the Chilean human rights
' to ' o
lawyer, published a treatise arguing that domestic and 13
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international law could be used to attenuate impunity. The 
amnesty laws in Argentina and Chile began to be unlockedJ o o
by the courts of Argentina and Chile prior to Pinochet's 
arrest in October 1998. but this was largely through
' o J o
creative interpretations of domestic law, rather than 
international law. From 1995 onwards-judicial reform and 
the appointment of new justices in both Argentina and 
Chile (especially in Chile), also contributed to the 
evolution of legal and political culture.
The Argentine and Chilean response to the cases in 
Spain and the Pinochet precedent rebutted the oft- 
repeated mantra of those seeking Pinochet's release: that 
the prosecution of human rights violators in countries 
involved in a transition to democracy would ferment 
anarchy and a return to authoritarian governance.
Another important consequence of the Spanish cases 
and the Pinochet precedent is that the amnesties that 
hitherto have often obstructed the prosecution of human 
rights violators are now being increasingly circumvented by
O O o J J
the courts and even ruled illegal under international law. 
This attenuation of impunity, allied to other developments 
in international law and politics diminishing impunity, may 
hasten the end of 'limited democracies': that is, they may 
advance the democratisation of those countries whose 
constitutions and public spheres were dictated by dictators 
and their military and associated allies and where, even 
after the return to democracy, the military retained 
significant political power. One consequence of the 
Spanish cases and the Pinochet case may be the demise of 
the idea that you can negotiate a limit to democracy and 
the prosecution of human rights abusers by way of a deal 
among the relevant political elite.
The 'Garzon effect' and the Pinochet precedent reflect 
and sustain a world-wide judicial revolution: namely, the 
ongoing and incomplete convergence in judicial culture, 
especially since the end of the Cold War, associated with 
juridification, the internationalisation of the United 
States' model of judicial review, the transference of judicial 
and allied legal norms from one jurisdiction to another as 
judges become increasingly prepared to resort to the 
human rights norms of foreign and transnational legal 
regimes (the globalisation of norms), the significance of 
transnational associations and networks (formal and 
informal) of activists, judges and lawyers, aided and 
abetted by the new information technology andJ oy
(inevitably) globalisation.
However, just as law and politics operated imperfectly, 
paradoxically, controversially and (to some extent) 
unexpectedly during the Pinochet case, so the impact of 
the Spanish investigations and the Pinochet precedent have 
also proved uneven, incomplete, indeterminate and 
subject to fierce contestation. Take the current situation in 
Chile. On the one hand, Pinochet's arrest and detention in 
Britain for 17 months, and the decision of the Spanish and
British courts, helped to break the spell that Pinochet cast 
over Chile. Pinochet arrived home a shadow of his former 
self in the eyes of the Chilean public. Shortly after 
Pinochet's return to Santiago, the Chilean Supreme Court 
lifted his senatorial immunity, opening the way for a trial 
there. In December 2000 and January 2001, Judge 
Guzman indicted Pinochet for murder and 
'disappearances'.
Cases filed against Pinochet continue to mount and now 
total about 250. These cases include the first complaint 
filed against Pinochet by former members of the army 
claiming they were tortured and unjustly discharged for 
opposing human rights abuses under the former dictator's 
rule. Meanwhile, Pinochet has publicly accepted 
responsibility 'as former President [...], of all of the acts 
that they say the [...] Armed Forces have committed'. 
Beyond Pinochet himself, the investigation and 
prosecution of human rights abusers in Chile has advanced 
significantly. Most recently, for example, torture charges 
have been brought against the current second in command 
of the Chilean air force.
On the other hand, the Chilean courts subsequently 
reduced the charges against Pinochet to accessory to the 
crime and then suspended all legal proceedings, deeming 
Pinochet mentally unfit to stand trial. The latter decision 
is currently on appeal to the Chilean Supreme Court and 
it remains at this point uncertain what further fate will 
finally befall die old Chilean leader. The 2-1 decision of 
the Santiago Court of Appeal to suspend all legal 
proceedings against Pinochet on health grounds and the 
earlier decisions of the courts to release Pinochet on bail, 
to reduce his charges, to enable him to evade the 
fingerprinting and mug shots that Chilean law requires of 
all persons indicted by Chilean courts, to refuse 
Argentina's request for Pinochet's extradition   coupled 
with the intense political pressure on the courts to go easy 
on Pinochet   tend to indicate that Pinochet enjoys a 
privileged position relative to other Chilean citizens.
Moreover, the constitutional, legal, and institutional 
inheritance of the military dictatorship, and the even 
deeper roots of authoritarianism in Chile, has yet to be 
challenged. To date, democratisation in Chile has beeno '
relatively superficial, rather than thoroughgoing.
Beyond Chile, too, the Garzon effect and the Pinochet 
precedent have also been subject to equivocation, 
attenuation and resistance. For example, the British 
authorities failed to carry out their obligation under the 
UN Torture Convention to put Pinochet on trial, as they 
had failed to do on two previous visits. Pinochet would 
have had no problems in Britain had it not been for the 
support of the Spanish courts, backed (albeit ambivalently) 
by the Spanish Government.
Since the establishment of the Pinochet precedent, 
authorities in several countries, including Belgium, France
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and the United States, have refused to investigate, detain, 
prosecute or extradite allegedly serious human rights 
violators. As the Argentine judges have become more 
creative and robust in their efforts to bring human rights 
violators to justice, so the Argentine Government's 
hostility towards the decisions of the courts has increased.
For example, two recent decisions of the Argentine 
courts have ruled that the so-called 'Full Stop' and 'Due 
Obedience' laws conferring impunity are incompatible 
with international law and, therefore, unlawful. They have 
also held that statutes of limitation do not to apply to 
crimes against humanity. During 2001, however, the 
Argentine Government rejected extradition requests from 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain for crimes committed in 
Argentina against citizens of those countries, contendingto to ' o
that Argentina alone has jurisdiction to prosecute those 
responsible for crimes committed in Argentina.
Judge Guzman and others have admonished the US 
Government for what Guzman called its 'very limited' 
assistance with the investigation and prosecution of 
human rights violators. The United States (along with 
Chile) were criticised in some quarters for exerting 
considerable pressure to persuade Britain to release 
Pinochet. There is deep opposition within die US 
administration to non-US courts having jurisdiction to 
prosecute current and former military and US officials.
And it is not just the United States that fears that the 
Pinochet precedent may open a veritable Pandora's box. 
Belgium probably has the broadest universal jurisdiction 
over human rights crimes of any country. It has therefore 
become the most favoured forum by those seeking to 
bring serious human rights abusers to justice. Current 
efforts to persuade Belgium to pursue cases against Cuban 
President Fidel Castro, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, Israel's 
premier, Ariel Sharon, and the Palestinian leader, Yasser 
Arafat, have caused some embarrassment in Brussels, and 
generated a debate as to whether its universal jurisdiction 
should be more circumscribed. Similar concerns have 
been expressed in France and Spain. The decision of the 
Spanish Audencia National of December 2000 refusing 
jurisdiction 'for the time being' in a case involving 
allegations of torture, terrorism and genocide in 
Guatemala may also reflect a judicial desire to discourage 
forum shopping, even where the case concerned involved 
egregious breaches of human rights.
That the Garzon effect and the Pinochet precedent are 
a site of contestation of governance was inevitable sinceo
they constitute a substantial legal restraint on the exercise 
of power and operate within a context where the history 
of human rights has largely been one of impunity for 
human rights violators. The events of 11 September 2001 
have cast a chill over world politics and may result in the 
downgrading of human rights. The threat of terrorism is 
now being used to justify torture and extended
imprisonment without trial. Moreover, it is to be expected 
that the Pinochet precedent, and the revolution of the 
judiciary that has accompanied it, are controversial since 
they raise important and difficult issues of law, politics and 
morality.
In part the problem is one that attends the birth of all 
new regimes, of the courts struggling with reconciling the 
old and the new, with the problems of hybridisation, and 
the relative indeterminacy that this implies. Working 
through the implications, unfinished business and loose 
ends arising from seminal cases, like the Pinochet case, 
tends to be a long and complex affair.
For example, the judicialisation of power has developed 
a momentum of its own and poses important problems of 
legitimacy and democratic accountability. Who is the 
judiciary accountable to? How can the 'politicisation' of 
the judiciary contribute to transparency, popular 
participation and the democratisation of the state? When 
does the application of general, commonly agreed norms 
concerning egregious breaches of human rights become a 
pretext for a new form of neo-colonialism, of third world 
dictators being brought into first world courts, or yet 
another means by which the law can make a business for 
itself? And will the judicialisation of power furnish the 
opportunity to realise the complicity of the first world in 
the actions that are being brought to trial?
Similar questions of accountability and transparency 
arise with respect to NGOs and networks   both of which 
played a crucial role in the effort to bring Pinochet to 
justice. There is an urgent need to create a more coherent 
system governing the operation of universal jurisdiction 
over international crimes   one that applies to all people 
in equivalent circumstances.
The potential conflicts that may arise between the 
traditional guarantees of fair trials and due process (the 
traditional prohibitions against establishing new criminal
r to o
offences by way of analogy or retrospectively, the heavy 
burden of proof on the prosecution and the doctrine that 
there can be no crime without a law) and the belief that, 
imperfect though it may be, universal jurisdiction may be the 
best justice currently available, also needs to be addressed. In 
part, this will require a clarification of how and when norms 
acquire the status of a jus cogens norm, and the relationship 
between universal jurisdiction and jus cogens norms.
The Pinochet case, like the OJ Simpson trial, illustrates 
the increasing, transnational influence of the media and 
mediatisation on the key actors in legal proceedings   
judges, lawyers, parties, intervenors and NGO's, 
witnesses, politicians, etc.   and therefore on the 
construction, conduct and reception of litigation. How 
should this phenomenon be addressed? What values and 
ends might be served by mediatisation? And to what 
extent is mediatisation driving the choices of organisationto to
models, strategies, and funding and legal responses?
15
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The Pinochet saga also raises questions about the extent 
to which the international rights movement is part of the 
problem, in that it restricts the possibilities of being a force 
for good by confining its critique of existing power 
structures to the language of human rights. Of course, 
there is a certain irony in the fact that Spain, of all nations, 
should have sought Pinochet's prosecution, since Chile had 
been a Spanish colony until the early nineteenth century. 
Like much of Spanish America, it had imported from Spain 
constitutional, legal and military regimes, reinforced and 
legitimated in the post-colonial period, that impeded 
democratisation, elevated the military's participation in 
domestic politics, and legitimated regimes of impunity for 
crimes committed by civilian and military government.
Moreover, Franco's Spain supported Pinochet, who was 
a confessed disciple of Franco, and the only foreign head 
of state to attend Franco's funeral. Spain was, therefore, 
partly responsible for Pinochet's success. And the 
influence was two-directional. Several of Pinochet's legal 
and constitutional measures were incorporated into the 
1978 post-Franco Spanish constitution. Thus, the 
Pinochet case was not about Spain interfering in the affairs 
of another country with which it had little or no 
connection. Rather, it illustrated the profound inter- 
connection of the two countries. To suggest that Spain 
would provide an appropriate forum for trying a former 
dictator that it had supported, while having done nothing 
to try its own, merely heightened the irony. It was as if the 
guilt and anger that Spain felt towards Franco was
projected onto Pinochet; and that Spain was seeking to 
make amends for what was not done to Franco. Thus, 
trying Pinochet in Spain might have served as a catalyst to 
confront Spain's as well as Chile's past, and their deep 
historical inter-connections.
Perhaps the charge of double standards is intrinsic to 
the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction by domestic 
courts. Is there any nation that has investigated and 
prosecuted every major human rights abuse that has ever 
fell within its jurisdiction or for which it was responsible? 
And are there any nations that do not have a colonial 
legacy, past or present? Indeed none of this lets Spain (or 
Britain) off the hook, or detracts from our duty to 
investigate and prosecute major human rights 
abusers. &
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IALS News
British Library and IALS sign formal agreement to work together
A concordat aimed at improving access to legal material 
for students and researchers has been signed between the 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies and the British Library.
The agreement provides a framework for further 
collaboration and co-operation between the two 
organisations. It will enable them to develop research 
resources more effectively, keep each other fully informed 
of their respective current programmes, and facilitate the 
development of joint activities. Both institutions will meet 
regularly to discuss matters of common interest and 
concern, and progress the primary aims of the concordat 
which are to:
* Reduce the overlap between British Library and IALS 
foreign legal journal holdings, and fill gaps in collecting 
material;
  Identify and fill gaps in the national collection of foreign 
legal materials;
  Commission research guides to foreign legal literature 
by country, and publish them on the web;
  Organise training courses to improve professional skills 
between staff in both organisations;
  Work towards the creation of a national central 
collection of official gazettes.
The concordat has grown out of the Foreign Law Guide 
(FLAG) project between the two institutions (see 'FLAG: 
the new Internet gateway to foreign law holdings in UK 
national and university libraries', Peter Clinch, Amicus 
Curiae, issue 41, page 20). FLAG is a database of foreign 
legal literature including law reports, legislation and 
treaties which covers nearly 60 UK libraries.
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